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Abstract 
We use the ethnicity of CEOs across 31 countries as a proxy for their common inherited beliefs and 
values and find an ethnicity effect in CEO compensation. We find that the ethnicity effect in variable pay 
is not driven by the ethnicity effects in corporate policy decisions, and that changes in CEO compensation 
are significantly larger when CEOs are replaced with a person from a different ethnicity. Our estimated 
ethnicity effect capture the future time reference and religion of CEOs’ ancestors. Finally, we find an 
ethnicity effect in performance-firing sensitivities (i.e., the sensitivity to being fired due to poor 
performance). 
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1. Introduction 
Do inherited beliefs and values influence CEO pay? CEOs, like any other individual, 
have their own preferences, which are likely to be reflected in their compensation arrangements. 
Understanding where these preferences originate and what shapes them helps us understand why 
some compensation packages might be effective in alleviating agency problems while others are 
not. In this paper we examine one potential source shaping CEOs’ preferences over 
compensation packages: their common inherited beliefs and values (i.e., the beliefs and values of 
their ancestors). We use the ethnicity of CEOs as a proxy for their common inherited beliefs and 
values. On the premise that ethnicity guides the behavior of economic agents and determines 
their preferences regarding the appropriate form of monetary rewards, we predict that ethnicity 
could explain variation in CEOs’ compensation arrangements (measured as the proportion of 
variable pay). 
Employing a global sample of CEOs across 31 countries, we group CEOs according to 
their ethnicities and track the ethnicities across multiple countries. We attribute an ethnicity to a 
CEO based on his/her forename and surname, using software developed by the Department of 
Geography at University College London, called OnoMAP. We are able to classify the sample of 
our international CEOs from 2001 to 2012 into 58 unique ethnicities. We document a strong 
ethnicity fixed effect in the proportion of compensation that is variable. The ethnicity fixed effect 
in our global model is incremental to economic determinants of variable pay, and is also 
incremental to year fixed effects, and industry fixed effects. The increase in adjusted R2 due to 
the inclusion of ethnicity fixed effects is 6.3%. Importantly, the ethnicity effects are jointly 
significant after controlling for firm fixed effects. In addition, we find that a significant portion 
of the within-country variation in the form of compensation is captured by ethnicity. On average, 
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including ethnicity effects increases the incremental explanatory power of within-country models 
for variable pay by an average of 2.3% across the 31 countries examined in our study. We also 
show that ethnicity matters even amongst US-born CEOs. Using the US setting and thereby 
keeping the corporate pay culture and the institutional environment constant, we study changes 
in compensation around CEO turnover events. This turnover analysis enables us to keep the firm 
constant. We find that for CEO turnover events that involve changes in beliefs and values (i.e., 
when the incumbent CEO is replaced by a CEO of a different ethnicity), variable pay changes 
significantly more relative to turnover events when the new CEO is of the same ethnicity as 
his/her predecessor. 
Next, we perform a battery of tests that rule out potential alternative explanations for the 
ethnicity effect in compensation. First, we find that the ethnicity effects for several corporate 
policy decisions and the ethnicity effects for compensation are related, indicating that they may 
capture similar preferences. However, the ethnicity preferences for compensation that we 
estimate are not subsumed by ethnicity preferences for corporate policy. As such, financing, 
investment, and payout policies do not seem to be indirect channels that entirely drive 
compensation. Thus, individual preferences of CEOs are observable in their compensation 
packages, notwithstanding corporate policy outcomes that are likely to reflect the collective 
preferences of the broader management team and Board of Directors, not just those of the CEO. 
This could explain why the ethnicity effects for CEO variable pay are related to, but also distinct 
from, the ethnicity effects for corporate policy.  
Second, we find that the effect of ethnicity, as a proxy for common inherited beliefs and 
values, is stronger when firms experience poor past performance. Under certain circumstances, 
typically adverse, firms implement a corporate change by bringing in new CEOs with different 
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beliefs and values. These circumstances can increase the potential bargaining power of the CEOs 
in negotiations, allowing them to receive a compensation arrangement in line with their 
preferences. 
We next conduct tests to enhance our confidence that the estimated ethnicity fixed effects 
indeed capture preferences regarding pay. Specifically, we allocate our ethnicities into groups 
based on two features that a priori are expected to shape preferences regarding variable pay, and 
we then examine whether these two features explain our ethnicity fixed effects. The first feature 
is future time reference.1 We document evidence that ethnicities whose linguistic origin has 
strong future time reference (i.e., people who speak languages that grammatically separate the 
future and the present) also prefer higher proportion of variable pay, consistent with tolerance for 
less cautious current compensation structures.2 The second feature expected to shape individuals’ 
preferences regarding pay is religious culture of economic incentives. World Values Surveys 
suggest Muslims (relative to Protestants and Catholics) prefer higher pay differences as 
incentives for individual effort (Norris and Inglehart, 2011). We document that ethnicities whose 
religious origin is Muslim prefer higher proportion of variable pay. This result is consistent with 
Muslim teachings that prefer profit-sharing contracts, similar to bonuses and equity awards, over 
pre-determined payments. We also find that ethnicities whose religious origin is Jewish prefer 
                                                 
1 Chen (2013) finds that people who speak languages that grammatically separate the future and the present (i.e., 
languages with strong future time reference) exhibit economic behavior that is different from those who speak 
languages with weak future time reference. In particular, people who speak strong future time reference languages 
disassociate the future from the present and their individual decisions are consistent with less cautious current 
behavior. 
2 Ideally, to assess intertemporal preferences we would like to decompose compensation into current versus deferred 
compensation. However, our global compensation data only enables us to decompose compensation into fixed 
versus variable pay. An assumption we make is that the greater the variable pay proportion, the more likely it is to 
be comprised of more deferred compensation. The widespread practice of using vesting periods for equity-based 
compensation suggests that this is not a completely unreasonable assumption. 
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higher proportion of variable pay, consistent with religious scholars’ general view that Judaism is 
closer to Islam than to Christianity. 
Finally, we examine the relation between common inherited beliefs and values and 
performance-firing sensitivity (i.e., responsiveness of the likelihood to terminate a CEO based on 
poor performance). We estimate performance-firing sensitivities at the firm-level using the 
observed relation between CEO turnover and poor past stock price performance. We find an 
ethnicity effect in performance-firing sensitivities. Further, we find that the ethnicity effects for 
performance-firing sensitivities are positively correlated with the ethnicity effects for variable 
pay suggesting that these measures capture similar inherited beliefs and values. However, due to 
the demanding data requirements of this analysis, we are only able to estimate the ethnicity effect 
in performance-firing sensitivities for 31 ethnicities. Therefore, we interpret these results with 
caution. 
Prior literature demonstrates that CEO and managerial style affects corporate outcomes 
and compensation structures (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; 
Chin et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2012; Graham et al., 2013; and Dahl et al., 2012).3 Graham et al. 
(2012) study top executives at US firms and find that manager fixed effects explain much of the 
variation in executive pay, and that compensation is related to personal characteristics, such as 
education, gender, age, etc. They also find that better-paid managers invest more in R&D and 
capital expenditures, use more debt, hold less cash, and pay out more dividends. Relatedly, using 
data gathered from psychometric tests, Graham et al. (2013) find that individual behavioral traits 
of CEOs such as optimism, risk-aversion and time preference are related to their attitudes toward 
                                                 
3 Related papers have examined specific characteristics, such as ability, interpersonal and communication skills, 
education, credentials, and gender, among others (e.g., Adams, et al., 2005; Bennedsen, et al., 2010; Kaplan, et al., 
2012; Custodio, et al., 2013; Fernandes et al., 2013; Carter, et al., 2014; Falato, et al., 2015).  
5 
mergers and acquisitions and capital structure, as well as toward their own compensation 
packages. 
Our paper contributes to these prior studies along several important dimensions. First, our 
methodology of grouping a global set of CEOs according to their ethnic origins enables us to 
identify systematically similar but unobservable personal features such as common inherited 
beliefs and values. Specifically, our results suggest that ethnicity captures common attitudes and 
behavioral traits across individuals around the world – this is different from previous research 
which has focused primarily on the individual. Second, we focus on inherited beliefs and values, 
which we expect to be persistent, compared to CEOs’ current behavioral traits that might be 
transient. Thus, a distinguishing feature of the individual differences we focus on is that 
individuals do not consciously choose or ‘acquire’ the inherited beliefs and values associated 
with their ethnicity.  
Third, our method of inferring variation in beliefs and values using CEOs’ names is less 
subjective as it does not rely on self-reported data about behaviors or attitudes. To our 
knowledge, we are the first to provide large-scale global evidence on the role of CEO beliefs and 
values in compensation arrangements and corporate policies. Since we think that CEO beliefs 
and values are more likely to influence the composition of pay packages rather than the level of 
pay individuals prefer, we focus on the form of compensation while most prior studies focus on 
the level of compensation. 
We also contribute to the growing literature on cultural economics that investigates how 
beliefs and values affect economic outcomes (Guiso, et al., 2006; Zingales, 2015) and, in 
particular, to the literature on cultural persistence (e.g., Guiso, et al. 2009, 2016; Nunn and 
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Wanthchekon, 2011; Alesina, et al., 2013).4 Our paper shows that ethnic origins of individuals 
capture a mechanism through which cultural persistence can be facilitated – parents pass on not 
only their ethnic origins to their offspring, but also their beliefs and values. Finally, our paper 
also expands our understanding of CEO compensation around the world by documenting that 
ethnicities explain global variation in variable pay over and above what we know about 
international differences in pay (e.g., Lambert, et al., 1991; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Conyon 
and Schwalbach, 2000; Conyon, et al., 2011; Fernandes et al., 2013; Gerakos, et al., 2013). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our research design and 
our data. Section 3 describes our results and Section 4 concludes. 
2. Hypothesis Development and Research Design 
To examine whether common inherited beliefs and values shape CEO compensation 
arrangements, we use CEOs’ ethnicity as a measure that is likely correlated with their common 
inherited beliefs and values. We argue that common inherited beliefs and values guide the 
behavior of economic agents and might determine their preferences regarding the appropriate 
form of compensation.5 For example, variation in common inherited beliefs and values across 
ethnicities may result in differences in the utility derived from compensation arrangements. 
Thus, we expect CEOs’ ethnicity to have significant explanatory power for form of pay. 
                                                 
4 There is also literature in economics that examines the role of identity in consumption and savings, household 
division of labor, social exclusion and poverty, gender discrimination in the labor market, retirement decisions, and 
labor relations (see Landa 1994; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005, 2010; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011; Chen, 2013). 
5  For example, common inherited beliefs and values of CEOs could influence (1) their behavior during 
compensation contract negotiations with the Board of Directors, (2) the extent to which they are motivated by 
variable incentive components, (3) their intertemporal consumption choice regarding current period compensation 
and deferred compensation, and (4) their preference over monetary rewards and non-monetary rewards. In our 
empirical tests, we focus on (2) and to some extent (3), where our assumption is that the greater the variable pay is 
more likely it is to be comprised of more deferred components of compensation. 
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Since self-reported data on CEO ethnicity is not available, we use a name-based ethnicity 
classification software called OnoMAP to link CEO names to their ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic origin.6 The software uses a name classification methodology developed in 2009 by 
researchers at the Department of Geography at University College London. OnoMAP covers 
over 500,000 forenames and one million surnames drawn from public name registries of 28 
countries. Each name in the OnoMAP dictionary has been classified into one of 185 OnoMAP 
types (the most granular level in the OnoMAP name classification taxonomy), together with a 
probability score that estimates the likelihood of a particular name belonging to that type based 
on the share of the population with that name in OnoMAP’s database. We use the OnoMAP type 
as an indication of the likely ethnic root of the name (i.e., ethnicity). When classifying a list of 
names, the OnoMAP software assesses both elements of a person’s name (forename and 
surname) to assign a final ethnicity classification at the individual level. In cases where a 
person’s forename and surname indicate the same ethnicity (i.e., coincident name classification), 
the software assigns that ethnicity to the name. In cases where there is a conflict between a 
person’s forename and surname (i.e., divergent name classification), the software assigns the 
ethnicity with the highest probability score to the name being analyzed. In our empirical analysis, 
we remove observations with divergent name classifications and those observations where the 
forename and the surname are unclassified or are not found in OnoMAP’s dictionaries. 
The OnoMAP classification estimates the most likely origins of a person’s name 
according to the following dimensions of identity: ethnic background, religious tradition, 
geographic origin, and language (i.e., common linguistic heritage). The diagnostic accuracy of 
                                                 
6 The name-based approach to infer ethnicity has been used in prior settings such as innovation and healthcare (for 
example, Petersen et al., 2011; Foley and Kerr, 2013; Schnier et al., 2014; Nathan, 2015). 
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OnoMAP in identifying population groups by ethnicity has been validated in several settings, 
with >95% classification accuracy (see Lakha, Gorman, and Mateos, 2011). We use OnoMAP to 
map each CEO’s name to their likely ethnic background and the associated religious and 
linguistic origin. 
In order to identify whether each ethnicity’s preference matters for compensation, we 
estimate a global model of variable pay. Our main variable of interest (Variable Pay) is the 
proportion of total compensation that is not fixed (i.e., salary). This variable enables meaningful 
cross-sectional comparisons of the form of pay because it controls for the total level of 
compensation in the denominator. However, the variable pay proportion is positively correlated 
with the level of compensation (Pearson correlation of +0.58; Spearman correlation of +0.69). 
This is not surprising given that firms need to provide higher compensation when more risk (via 
variable pay) is imposed on the CEO.  
We use 57,630 CEO-year observations drawn from 31 countries over 2001 to 2012 to 
estimate the following panel regression for Variable Pay (CEO subscripts suppressed). Our 
sample starts in 2001 because coverage in Capital IQ for the countries in our sample is sparse 
prior to 2000. 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐  𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡 
(1) 
The dependent variable is Variable Pay. Lagged size, book to price, idiosyncratic volatility, 
market leverage, tenure and contemporaneous stock returns are included as economic 
determinants of total compensation as these variables have been identified by prior literature to 
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be related to CEO compensation. Size is proxied by log sales, Book-to-Price is included as a 
measure of growth opportunities, Idiosyncratic Volatility measures firm-specific risk, Stock 
Return accounts for contemporaneous firm performance, Leverage measures the degree of 
financial risk, and Tenure is included to control for length of service as a CEO. In addition, we 
control for the CEO’s intrinsic ability by using Past Performance, measured as the industry-
adjusted stock returns for the previous year during the same CEO’s tenure (see details on the 
construction of variables in the notes below Table 2). We include year and industry fixed effects 
in the model and also control for each country’s average effect. The model is estimated without 
an intercept as we are interested in estimating and extracting each ethnicity’s fixed effect.  
We view the ethnicity fixed effects from our global model as an estimate of each 
ethnicity’s preference for variable pay. If these fixed effects are jointly significant it supports a 
role for ethnicity in determining compensation. In addition, we conduct a placebo test to examine 
whether our findings from the estimation of equation (1) are spurious by assigning CEOs to 
random ethnicities, and we also re-estimate equation (1) for a subset of US-born CEOs to assess 
whether ethnicity fixed effects capture common beliefs and values that are inherited through the 
generations. 
Using the US setting and thereby keeping the corporate pay culture and the institutional 
environment constant, we also examine firm-level changes in compensation around CEO 
turnover events. If ethnicity as our measure of common inherited beliefs and values indeed 
captures variation in preferences for monetary rewards, we would expect to observe larger 
changes in variable pay in cases where the new CEO and the old CEO are of different ethnicities. 
This approach provides a clean test to identify the ethnicity effect in variable pay by keeping the 
firm constant while exploring the effect of change in common inherited beliefs and values. 
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Next, we examine potential alternative explanations for why the ethnicity of CEOs, as a 
proxy for their common inherited beliefs and values, may influence compensation. First, 
different management styles of CEOs may influence financing, investment and payout policies 
of firms. To the extent managerial styles align with CEOs’ ethnicity preferences, corporate 
policies may indirectly influence compensation arrangements. We test whether ethnicity effects 
for compensation can be explained by, or are related to, ethnicity effects for corporate policies. 
Second, a replacement CEO brought in as a ‘change agent’ may have increased power in 
negotiating compensation arrangements, and this bargaining power might be the reason that 
firms decide to compensate CEOs in line with their preferences. Using CEO turnover events, we 
test whether the ethnicity effect is stronger when incumbent CEOs are not retiring, and in 
situations where firms are experiencing poor performance. Further details are in Section 3.4. 
To enhance our confidence that ethnicities capture common inherited beliefs and values 
shaping preferences regarding pay, we identify two innate characteristics that a priori are 
expected to shape preferences regarding variable pay and, then, examine whether these two 
dimensions explain our estimated ethnicity fixed effects. The first dimension is future time 
reference. Chen (2013) examines the effect of language on economic behavior, such as 
intertemporal decisions regarding savings, health and retirement assets. The transmission 
mechanism from language to preferences is in the way different languages encode time 
differently. English is an example of languages with strong future time reference, as it makes a 
clear distinction between the present and the future. German is an example of languages with 
weak future time reference, i.e., it does not make a strong distinction between present and future. 
Chen (2013) finds that language influences the behavior of economic agents. People who speak 
weak future time reference languages save more, retire with more wealth, smoke less, practice 
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safer sex, and are less obese. We interpret this pattern of behavior to be consistent with a more 
cautious, or more future-oriented, approach to economic decisions. We then examine whether 
our estimated ethnicity fixed effects indeed capture this behavioral dimension. Thus, we predict 
strong future time reference to be consistent with tolerance for less cautious current 
compensation structures (i.e., higher proportion of variable pay). Specifically, we estimate the 
following cross-sectional model at the ethnicity level: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (2) 
Variable Pay Ethnicity Fixed Effects are the ethnicity fixed effects for variable pay estimated 
using equation (1). Strong Future Time Reference indicates whether each ethnicity’s associated 
language has a strong (indicated by 1) or weak (indicated by 0) future time reference. 
A second feature we examine that is expected to determine pay preference is the religious 
culture of economic incentives. Prior research based on World Values Survey evidence suggests 
that Muslims prefer larger pay differences as incentives for individual effort relative to 
Protestants and Catholics (Norris and Inglehart, 2011, see Chapter 7). Furthermore, Muslim 
beliefs place great importance on the role of God’s Will (i.e., In Sha Allah) and on divine 
predestination (i.e., Qadar) in shaping the outcome of uncertain events. Islamic teachings also 
encourage profit-sharing contractual arrangements to compensate for risk and uncertainty; pre-
determined returns and fixed interest payments are strictly forbidden. In fact, many commercial 
transactions in Islamic economies are structured as contingent contracts with option-like features, 
similar to the stock and option awards that comprise the variable proportion of CEO 
compensation. Thus, we predict the ethnicity fixed effects for variable pay to be larger for 
Muslims. There is no similar World Values Survey evidence about Jewish preferences in Norris 
and Inglehart (2011) so we do not make a specific prediction. However, we note that amongst the 
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three major monotheistic Abrahamic religions, religious scholars generally view Judaism as 
being closer to Islam than to Christianity. Indeed, Islam and Judaism are both considered as 
being closer to orthopraxy, while Christianity is considered as being closer to orthodoxy.7 Thus, 
we are interested in observing whether the coefficient on Jewish behaves similarly to the 
coefficient on Muslim. We identify the most likely religious origin of the CEO’s ethnicity and 
estimate the following model for variable pay ethnicity fixed effects: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑢𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝑂𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑥𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(3) 
where Muslim, Jewish, Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox are indicator variables for the 
respective religious origin associated with the ethnicity. The remaining religion groups such as 
Buddhist, Hindu and Sikh are included in the benchmark group. The dependent variable is the 
ethnicity fixed effects from equation (1) for variable pay. 
Finally, we examine the relation between the inherited beliefs and values of CEOs and 
the sensitivity of being fired for performance. We are interested in examining firing sensitivity as 
it is a likely to be an important component of overall job attractiveness that interacts with the 
compensation arrangement, and hence influences CEOs’ employment decisions. We estimate 
performance-firing sensitivities at the firm-level using the observed relation between CEO 
turnover events and negative industry-adjusted past stock price performance. In order to 
distinguish between likely instances of involuntary turnover from voluntary turnover, we restrict 
                                                 
7 Orthopraxy is defined as right action, and orthodoxy is defined as right belief (see Oxford Dictionary of World 
Religions). As such, Judaism is similar to Islam in its emphasis on practice rather than belief, on law rather than 
dogma. The primary religious discipline in Judaism and Islam has been religious law; for Christianity it has been 
theology. Some examples of similarities between Jewish and Muslim practices include the consumption of ‘kosher’ 
and ‘halal’ meat, and the restriction on consuming pork. Also, Muslim tradition forbids receiving or charging 
interest, and similar Jewish tradition forbids charging interest within the community, but permits it to outsiders. 
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the analysis to firms that experience at least one year of negative past performance during our 
sample period. We estimate the following first-stage model for each firm: 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
where Turnover is an indicator variables that identifies whether there was turnover in that year 
(indicated by 1) or not (indicated by 0). Size and Tenure are as defined previously and are used to 
control for firm-level and CEO-level determinants of the likelihood of turnover. Negative Past 
Performance is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 when the industry-adjusted 
stock return is negative, and 0 otherwise. Further, because we estimate this model by firm we 
require at least 4 observations for each firm. The demanding data requirements for estimating 
this regression do not allow us to include additional control variables. The estimated coefficient 
on Negative Past Performance from equation (4) provides a measure of the likelihood of 
involuntary CEO termination conditional on the firm experiencing negative industry-adjusted 
past performance (i.e., performance-firing sensitivity). For firms that experience negative past 
performance but do not have any CEO turnover during our sample period, a coefficient cannot be 
estimated and we assign a performance-firing sensitivity of zero (i.e., insensitive). 
Then, we use these coefficients in the following second stage cross-sectional regression: 
𝑃𝐹𝑆𝑖 =  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐  𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖 
(5) 
PFS is the Performance-Firing Sensitivity coefficient from equation (4), and all other variables 
are as defined previously. We use the most recent available observation for each firm to identify 
the ethnicity of the CEO associated with that firm, as well as to collect firm characteristics. 
Similar to the variable pay ethnicity fixed effects, we view the ethnicity fixed effects from 
equation (5) as an estimate of each ethnicity’s preference for performance-firing sensitivity. If 
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these fixed effects are jointly significant it supports a role for ethnicity in determining 
preferences for firms with certain levels of performance-firing sensitivity (i.e., job security). 
CEO compensation data for US firms is extracted from ExecuComp, and international 
compensation data is collected from Capital IQ’s People Intelligence database. Using Capital IQ 
data also increases the sample of US firms that we are able to examine. We combine the 
compensation data from the two sources using overlapping observations to create a mapping 
algorithm. We retain all observations with total compensation data for the CEO that is either 
reported by the firm or that can be calculated using disclosure of the components of 
compensation, and we also require information on the fixed component of compensation (i.e., 
salary). Compensation data is converted to constant 2005 US Dollars using the average exchange 
rate for the twelve months prior to the fiscal year end, and the Consumer Price Index for each 
country (rebased to 100 in 2005). Our main variable of interest, Variable Pay, is the proportion 
(i.e., percentage) of total compensation that is variable, and is computed as (Total Compensation 
– Salary) / Total Compensation. 
We collect annual firm fundamentals from Compustat North America for US firms, 
Compustat Global for international firms, and FactSet Fundamentals for firms not covered by 
Compustat. Using average currency exchange rates for the flow variables such as sales, and 
period-end currency exchange rates for the remaining stock variables, the firm fundamentals are 
converted to US Dollars. These fundamentals are then used to compute size, book-to-price, and 
leverage for use as control variables. 
Returns and price data are collected from CRSP for US listed firms, Compustat North 
America for Canadian firms and Compustat Global for international firms. Daily returns are used 
to compute annual returns for each fiscal year, and also to compute idiosyncratic volatility of 
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returns. Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals from a 
market model estimated using daily returns over the prior year, and where the country of 
exchange for each firm’s primary share listing is used to identify the appropriate market 
benchmark. Where available, country-level MSCI index levels are used to compute market 
returns, otherwise returns on the local national stock index are used. For US firms, the CRSP 
value-weighted market returns are used as the benchmark. 
Table 1 describes the sample construction procedure and summarizes the composition of 
the sample by country. After combining the compensation data from ExecuComp and Capital IQ 
with available fundamental data we have 99,219 CEO-year observations. We trim variables at 
1% and 99% by country each year, except tenure, returns, and idiosyncratic volatility. We double 
check the five smallest and five largest return observations against data from Datastream and 
find no data errors. Similarly, the extreme values for idiosyncratic volatility appear to be 
reasonable. We also manually search company websites to verify the accuracy of the five largest 
values for tenure. Since we find no data errors in these variables, we do not trim them. 8 
Furthermore, we remove observations that cannot be classified by the OnoMAP name-based 
classification software, and we also require at least 10 observations for each ethnicity and for 
each ethnicity to be present in at least two out of the 31 countries in our sample. Finally, we 
remove those observations where OnoMAP delivers divergent ethnicity classifications using the 
forename and the surname of the CEO.  
                                                 
8 Nevertheless, in robustness tests we also trim the top and bottom 1% of returns and idiosyncratic volatility and re-
estimate our main model in column 4 of Table 4. We find that our results remain unchanged. While the sample size 
reduces to 55,736 CEO-year observations due to the additional trimming, we find that the ethnicity fixed effects in 
variable pay remain jointly significant with an F-statistic of 2.35 (p-value = 0.000) and 28.1% of the ethnicity fixed 
effects are statistically significant. 
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These exclusion criteria result in a final sample of 57,630 CEO-year observations that 
covers the period from 2001 to 2012 for 31 countries and represents 58 ethnicities. The US is the 
most heavily represented country in the sample with 47.8% of the CEO-year observations, 
followed by the United Kingdom with 10.4% of the observations. The lowest representation is in 
Taiwan with less than 1% of the observations relating to an average of 3 firms. The final sample 
period and country representation is determined largely by the availability of all required data, 
with the main constraint being disclosure of compensation data that is captured by Capital IQ. 
Table 2 (Panel A) reports descriptive statistics for our main variables of interest, and also 
provides details regarding the computation of each variable. Table 2 (Panel B) reports averages 
of the main CEO-level and firm-level variables by country. In the cross-section of countries, 
variable pay proportion ranges from 16% in Iceland to 52% in Switzerland, compared with the 
US average of 49%. Table 2 (Panel C) reports the averages of the CEO-level variables for each 
of the 58 unique ethnicities in our sample. The ethnicities with the highest representation are 
English (49.8%), Celtic (10.1%), Scottish (5.6%), Irish (5.5%), Hong Kongese (4.1%), and 
Indian (3.6%). The ethnicities with the lowest representation are Bangladeshi, Breton, Catalan, 
Czech, Hungarian, Lebanese, Malaysian, Northern Irish and Serbian. Table 2 (Panel C) also 
reports the unconditional average variable pay for each ethnicity, as well as the average tenure. 
Using the language associated with each ethnicity, the table also reports whether the ethnicity’s 
language has a strong future time reference (i.e., the indicator variable takes on value of 1). 
Finally, Table 3 reports the average yearly correlations between the main variables. 
Pearson correlations are reported above the diagonal and Spearman rank correlations are reported 
below the diagonal. Variable pay is positively correlated with size, tenure, returns, and past 
performance. Book-to-price is negatively correlated with variable pay (Pearson of -0.13) which 
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is consistent with pay being positively related to growth opportunities as represented by the 
market-to-book ratio. Idiosyncratic volatility is negatively associated, whereas leverage is 
positively associated with variable pay. These relations are consistent with those reported in prior 
research on the determinants of compensation (see Table 2 in Conyon, Core and Guay, 2011). 
3. Results 
3.1. Ethnicity Fixed Effects in Global Model of Variable Pay 
First, we test whether ethnicity, our proxy for inherited beliefs and values, matters for 
variable pay. We estimate a global model of variable pay using all 57,630 CEO-year 
observations in our sample. Table 4 reports the results. In column 1, we regress variable pay 
portion (i.e., Variable Pay) on economic determinants of compensation suggested by prior 
research. The coefficients on size, book-to-price, idiosyncratic volatility, stock return, market 
leverage, tenure, and past performance are all statistically significant and consistent with the 
signs reported in previous research. The reported t-statistics are based on standard errors that are 
clustered by ethnicity and year. Collectively, the model explains 13.4% of the variation in 
Variable Pay. Column 2 then includes year and industry fixed effects which increases the 
explanatory power of the model to 17.9% while taking nothing away from the economic 
determinants of compensation. In column 3, we add country fixed effects and the explanatory 
power of the model increases significantly to 70.1%.  
In column 4, we include ethnicity fixed effects which increases the adjusted R2 of the 
model to 76.4%. We formally test whether the estimated ethnicity intercepts are jointly 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels. The reported F-statistic is large (2.62) 
and has an associated p-value of 0.000, suggesting that ethnicity is systematically related to 
variable pay. Importantly, 29.8% of the ethnicity fixed effects are statistically significant at 
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conventional levels, which suggests that their joint significance is not driven by one or two 
coefficients. We report this additional statistic in order to mitigate potential concerns that in 
samples with a large number of fixed effects, standard F-tests for joint significance may be less 
appropriate (see Wooldridge, 2002).9 Thus, the percentage of significant ethnicity coefficients 
provides a way to corroborate the results of the F-tests. 
In column 5, we remove industry and country effects, and instead control for firm fixed 
effects. We continue to find that the ethnicity effects are jointly significant with a large F-statistic 
(2.52) and that 23.6% of the ethnicity fixed effects are statistically significant. Overall, the 
results in Table 4 support the role for ethnicity in compensation contracts around the world. The 
inclusion of ethnicity fixed effects in the global model of variable pay increases the adjusted R2 
by 6.3% (from column 3 to 4). Thus, a significant portion of the global variation in the variable 
pay proportion of compensation appears to be captured by ethnicity fixed effects. 
In order to evaluate the suitability of using a fixed effects model, we also conduct a 
Hausman (1978) test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated from a random effects 
model are identical to the coefficients estimated from a fixed effects model. The results of this 
test favor using the estimates from the less restrictive fixed effects model. Hence, for our primary 
analyses we continue to rely on the fixed effects model. However, for completeness we also 
estimate a hybrid correlated random effects model which enables us to control for CEO fixed 
effects while simultaneously including country, industry, year, firm and ethnicity as random 
effects (see Allison, 2009; and Wooldridge, 2010). The hybrid correlated random effects model 
combines some of the benefits of the fixed effects and random effects model by taking advantage 
                                                 
9 Fee, Hadlock and Pierce (2013) have raised this concern primarily regarding CEO style studies that include a large 
number of manager-specific dummy variables. Our models include at most 58 ethnicity fixed effects which should 
reduce this concern to some extent. 
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of the “within” and “between” variation of the dependent variable. The model is estimated 
through OLS as a random effects model with both time-invariant and time-varying predictors 
(see Mundlak, 1978). We report these results in column 6 of Table 4. Even in this more 
restrictive model, the ethnicity effects remain jointly significant. The results of the hybrid model 
suggest that even after controlling for CEO fixed effects, the CEO’s ethnicity, estimated as a 
random effect, has explanatory power for variation in variable pay. 
Finally, we conduct a placebo test to assess whether the joint significance of our ethnicity 
fixed effects for variable pay is spurious. We randomly assign CEOs to one of 58 bins for 
ethnicities, and then estimate ethnicity fixed effects and their joint significance using F-tests. We 
repeat this process 1,000 times and collect the F-statistics for all simulations. Figure 1 shows that 
the F-statistic for the joint significance of these random ethnicity fixed effects is significant at the 
5% level only 45 out of the 1,000 times this exercise was repeated. The average F-statistic for the 
1,000 different simulations is 0.99 which compares with a critical F-statistic of 1.33 at a 5% level 
of significance, and our original F-statistic of 2.62 (see Table 4). This gives us confidence (about 
95%) that the joint significance of our ethnicity fixed effects is not in fact spurious. Overall, our 
results suggest that common inherited beliefs and values of CEOs matter for form of 
compensation.10 
3.2. Persistence in Common Inherited Beliefs and Values 
                                                 
10 We also conduct additional robustness tests. For example, one potential concern is that female CEOs may have 
changed their surname after marriage to a different ethnicity than their own and this could affect our results. Since 
we have removed divergent name classifications, we believe that this concern is mitigated. Nevertheless, we observe 
similar results after removing all female CEOs (less than 3% of observations). Another potential concern is related 
to slaveholder names being given to ex-slaves in the US which could result in incorrect ethnicity classifications. We 
identify African American surnames using slaveholder names and ownership of slaves reported in the 1870 US 
census. This data is available here: http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~ajac/. We have removed 
these potentially misclassified names in the US since we do not know for sure whether a CEO in our data is an 
African American or not, and the results continue to hold. 
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We then examine whether the ethnicity fixed effects are indeed related to common 
inherited beliefs and values by focusing on a subset of CEOs that are born and raised in a 
different country to their ethnic origin. The US setting enables us to do this because of a long 
history of immigration. However, we want to focus on at least second-generation immigrants in 
order to identify the persistent effect of inherited beliefs and values. We hand-collect data on 
place of birth for a subset of US CEOs, and identify those that are US-born. We then estimate 
equation (1) for these CEOs. Table 5 reports the results for this subset which represents 9 
ethnicities. Column 1 of Table 5 shows that the ethnicity fixed effects for variable pay continue 
to be jointly significant for US born CEOs (F-statistic of 6.60; p-value of 0.000). This result is 
robust to using a measure of generalist versus specialist managerial ability from Custodio, 
Ferreira and Matos (2013) labeled General Ability Index instead of Past Performance in column 
2. In addition to firm-level controls, we also control for personal characteristics of CEOs such as 
age, gender, postgraduate education and founder status of the CEO. 
Overall, Table 5 provides support for our argument that ethnicity captures common 
inherited beliefs and values. We find that even in the subset of CEOs that are born in a different 
country from their ethnic origin, ethnicity has an effect on compensation. Our results suggest that 
what ethnicity captures is persistent across generations – CEOs’ common inherited beliefs and 
values shape their compensation contracts. 
3.3. Changes in Ethnicity around CEO Turnover Events 
Next we examine whether the changes in compensation around CEO turnover events are 
related to changes in ethnicity. We use a single country setting (i.e., the US) to keep the 
corporate pay culture and the institutional environment constant. Further, by focusing on CEO 
turnovers we are able to keep the firm constant and therefore all unobservable firm 
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characteristics and potential firm-to-CEO matching issues are also held constant. While there is 
still a possibility that the firm itself is changing around the turnover event, we believe this 
analysis allows us to draw stronger inferences about the ethnicity effect on CEO compensation.  
Table 6 reports our analysis of 440 US firms that experience a CEO turnover event once 
during our sample period and where all data is available for firm and CEO characteristics. We 
use compensation data for the last full year prior to the incumbent CEO’s departure and the first 
full year after the replacement CEO’s arrival to compute the change in compensation around the 
turnover event (i.e., turnover years are excluded from the analysis). Our dependent variable is 
absolute change in variable pay percentage. Specifically, absolute change in variable pay 
percentage is computed as the natural logarithm of the new CEO’s variable pay proportion for 
the year after turnover divided by the old CEO’s variable pay proportion for the year before 
turnover. Our variable of interest is an indicator variable, Change in Ethnicity, which takes the 
value of 1 if the replacement and incumbent CEOs are of different ethnicities, and zero 
otherwise. The regression model controls for absolute changes in the determinants of 
compensation as well as absolute changes in the personal characteristics of the CEOs. We 
exclude ethnicity fixed effects as we are interested in estimating the effect of all ethnicity 
changes as a group using the Change in Ethnicity indicator. We find that for CEO turnover 
events that involve changes in common inherited beliefs and values (i.e., when the incumbent 
CEO is replaced by a CEO of a different ethnicity), the variable pay proportion changes 
significantly more relative to turnover events where the new CEO is of the same ethnicity as 
his/her predecessor. This ethnicity effect is captured by a statistically significant coefficient for 
Change in Ethnicity in column 1. This result supports our argument that ethnicity as a measure of 
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common inherited beliefs and values captures cross-sectional variation in preferences about 
monetary rewards. 
3.4. Potential Explanations for the Ethnicity Effect in Compensation 
We have argued that the ethnicity effect in compensation captures common inherited 
beliefs and values. There are potential alternative explanations for the ethnicity effect we 
observe. First, different managerial styles of CEOs may influence financing, investment and 
payout policies of firms, and these policies may indirectly influence compensation arrangements. 
Second, a replacement CEO brought in as a ‘change agent’ may have increased power in 
negotiating compensation arrangements, and this bargaining power might be one of the reasons 
that firms decide to compensate CEOs in line with their preferences. We examine these potential 
explanations separately to shed light on which explanation is more prevalent in our data. 
3.4.1. The Indirect Effect of Ethnicity ‘Style’ for Corporate Policy  
Graham et al. (2012) find that better-paid managers invest more in R&D and capital 
investments, use more financial leverage, pay more dividends and hold less cash in the company. 
They argue that these results suggest that manager compensation fixed effects are related to 
manager style fixed effects for investment and financing policy. Thus, one explanation for our 
results could be that CEO styles influence corporate policy, and that CEOs are being 
compensated for the risk-taking behavior embedded in these corporate policies. To examine this 
possibility, we perform the following analysis. 
First, we extract ethnicity effects for each of the corporate policy variables used in 
Graham et al. (2012) using the equivalent of column 5 in Table 4 (i.e., with year, firm and 
ethnicity effects). For example, to estimate Investment policy-related ethnicity fixed effects, we 
estimate the global model with Investment as the dependent variable. The results are reported in 
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Table 7 (Panel A). The ethnicity effects are jointly significant at conventional levels for 
Investment, R&D, Leverage, Dividend Payer and Dividend Yield, with 16% to 24% of the 
ethnicity effects being statistically significant. The statistical significance of the ethnicity effect 
in Cash Holdings is weak. Similarly, there is a strong ethnicity effect in Variable Pay (see 
column 7). Thus, there seems to be an ethnicity effect in both corporate policy and compensation 
variables.  
Next, we examine whether the ethnicity fixed effects for variable pay proportion are 
correlated with the ethnicity fixed effects for corporate policy. Specifically, in the spirit of Table 
7 in Graham et al. (2012) we examine the pairwise correlation between the estimated ethnicity 
fixed effects for Variable Pay and the estimated ethnicity fixed effects for R&D, Investment, 
Leverage, Cash Holdings, Dividend Payer and Dividend Yield. Table 7 (Panel B) reports the 
correlations. The ethnicity fixed effects for compensation are positively correlated with the 
ethnicity effects for leverage (coefficient of 0.34), investment (coefficient of 0.20) and dividend 
yield (coefficient of 0.28), and negatively correlated with the ethnicity effects for cash holdings 
(coefficient of -0.23). These correlations are quite consistent with the relations reported by 
Graham et al. (2012) in their Table 7 (see column 2) between manager fixed effects for 
compensation and manager fixed effects for corporate policy. We also examine the multivariate 
relation between variable pay ethnicity fixed effects and ethnicity fixed effects for the various 
corporate policy variables. Panel C of Table 7 reports the results. In column 1, we use the within-
country annual ranks for each variable when estimating the ethnicity fixed effects, while in 
column 2 we use the continuous variables when estimating the ethnicity fixed effects. Differently 
from the pairwise correlations, when all the ethnicity fixed effects for the corporate policy 
variables are included, they are mostly insignificant in explaining ethnicity fixed effects for 
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variable pay. While the signs are consistent with the previously reported correlations for R&D, 
Cash Holdings and Dividend Yield, we find that only the ethnicity fixed effect for Cash Holdings 
is statistically significant.11 However, it is possible that the weak relations we find are due to lack 
of statistical power. 
Finally, we examine whether the link between CEOs’ beliefs and values and corporate 
policy decisions could explain why compensation is associated with beliefs and values. We argue 
that ethnicity preferences for variable pay are distinct from the ethnicity preferences for 
corporate policy. In Table 8, we include the firm policy variables used by Graham et al. (2012) 
as additional control variables in our global model of variable pay (columns 4–6 from Table 4). 
To the extent these corporate policy variables explain much of the variation in variable pay, 
ethnicity should lose significance. We find that even after controlling for the investment, 
financing and payout characteristics of firms, the ethnicity effects for variable pay remain jointly 
significant. Specifically, we add these variables to the specifications in columns 4, 5 and 6 of 
Table 4 and the ethnicity fixed effects for variable pay remain jointly significant at conventional 
levels with F-statistics of 2.49, 2.58 and 1.65, respectively. In addition, 26.3%, 23.6% and 17.5% 
of the ethnicity fixed effects for variable pay are statistically significant.  
                                                 
11 Our results are consistent with Graham et al. (2012) who also find insignificant coefficients for 4 out of the 6 
coefficients in column 2 of Table 7 when using a similar mover dummy variable approach to estimate manager fixed 
effects separately from firm fixed effects (only Investment and Dividend paying indicator are significant at the 10% 
level). The stronger results in column 1 of Table 7 in Graham et al. (2012) rely on a different identification strategy 
which leverages the small number of mover observations to infer information about non-mover managers who work 
at firms that have employed at least one mover. Our sample is CEOs only, rather than all managers as in Graham et 
al. (2012), so we are unable to implement this identification strategy as we cannot observe a mover CEO as well as a 
non-mover CEO at the same firm at the same time. It is also worth noting, that while Graham et al. (2012) use log 
total compensation as the dependent variable, we are examining the variable pay proportion. While total 
compensation and variable pay proportion is indeed positively correlated (Pearson correlation of +0.58), our 
objective is to examine the form of pay rather than the level of pay. 
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Overall, we find that while the ethnicity preferences for corporate policy are indeed 
related to ethnicity preferences for variable pay in a manner consistent with the findings in 
Graham et al. (2012), the ethnicity preferences for variable pay that we estimate are not 
subsumed by ethnicity preferences for corporate policy. We interpret these results as suggesting 
that individual preferences of CEOs are more directly observable in their compensation 
packages, while corporate policy outcomes are likely to reflect the collective preferences of the 
broader management team and Board of Directors, not just those of the CEO. This could explain 
why the ethnicity effects for CEO variable pay are related to, but also distinct from, the ethnicity 
effects for corporate policy. 
3.4.2. Bargaining Power of ‘Change Agents’ 
We expect that the effect of a CEO’s beliefs and values on compensation would be bigger 
when the CEO has more power in compensation negotiations. We explore this further using the 
CEO turnover setting. We focus on turnover instances where the outgoing CEO is younger than 
65 years old. We expect that departures of CEOs aged 65 and over are likely to be planned 
retirements, and that the replacement of CEOs in these instances is likely to be arranged through 
succession planning. Thus, we assume that turnover instances where departing CEOs are 
younger than 65 years are more likely to be unexpected, and hence may be characterized by 
more bargaining power for the incoming CEO since the firm is in need to replace the CEO over a 
shorter time frame. In these instances, we indeed observe that changes in beliefs and values 
(captured by the Change in Ethnicity variable given different ethnic origins of the incumbent and 
replacement CEO) are accompanied by larger changes in variable pay (see column 2 of Table 6). 
We expect that firms may actively be seeking to change the status quo in situations where 
the outgoing CEO does not leave due to planned retirement. When firms bring in new CEOs with 
26 
different beliefs and values, they may be looking for a ‘change agent’, and we expect that these 
individuals would have more bargaining power in negotiating their pay and hence are more 
likely to receive pay consistent with their preferences. We find evidence consistent with this 
argument in Table 9 where our variable of interest is the interaction term (Change in Ethnicity × 
Past Decline) with a predicted positive sign. In circumstances where we think firms might want 
to implement a corporate change (e.g., when faced with a recent decline in performance as 
captured by increased employee turnover or deterioration in employee productivity), we observe 
that replacement CEOs with different beliefs and values compared to the incumbent CEOs are 
more likely to reverse the performance decline. This is especially so when the incumbent CEO is 
younger than 65 years old, i.e., not likely to be retiring (see columns 2 and 4). Although ex post, 
this evidence corroborates the argument that these individuals brought in to implement change 
have relatively greater bargaining power and therefore receive pay consistent with their pay 
preferences. 
3.5. Future Time Reference and Variable Pay Preferences 
So far we have documented that there is an ethnicity effect in CEO compensation that is 
incremental to economic determinants, year, industry, firm and country fixed effects. Further, in 
a hybrid correlated random effects model, we have shown that ethnicity is incremental to CEO 
fixed effects. We have also documented that ethnicity fixed effects are statistically significant for 
a subset of CEOs who are born in a different country from their ethnic origin, i.e., that the beliefs 
and values captured by ethnicities are persistent across generations. In addition, we have 
examined potential different explanations for the observed ethnicity effect in compensation. 
We now attempt to understand why ethnicity fixed effects are significant. We do this by 
investigating whether the ethnicity fixed effects capture innate characteristics of ethnicities that 
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are expected to influence variable pay preferences. Chen (2013) finds that languages that 
grammatically separate the future and the present (i.e., languages with strong future time 
reference) exhibit economic behavior that is different from those who speak languages with 
weak future time reference. Specifically, people who speak strong future time reference 
languages save less, retire with less wealth, smoke more, practice less safer sex, and are more 
obese. We interpret this pattern of behavior as consistent with a less cautious, or less future-
oriented, approach to intertemporal economic decisions. 
In Table 10, we use Strong Future Time Reference as a variable that proxies for 
ethnicities’ future oriented behavior. Strong Future Time Reference takes the value of 1 (0) when 
the language associated with the CEO’s ethnicity incorporates a strong (weak) reference to the 
future. A testable prediction is that ethnicities with languages that have a strong distinction 
between the future and the present would prefer higher variable pay since they tend to be less 
cautious. The results in Table 10 support this prediction. We regress the ethnicity fixed effects in 
variable pay extracted from the global model in Table 4 on Strong Future Time Reference. 
Across the 58 ethnicities, we find a statistically significant positive coefficient on Strong Future 
Time Reference for variable pay (0.040; t-statistic of 3.45). The explanatory power of this 
variable for ethnicity fixed effects is 8.1%. In column 2 we redo the analysis after first replacing 
statistically insignificant ethnicity fixed effects with zeroes, and in column 3 we redo the analysis 
based on variable pay ethnicity effects that are re-estimated after excluding US observations 
which comprise a significant portion of our sample (47.8%). In column 4, we use these re-
estimated variable pay ethnicity effects without the US observations and replace the statistically 
insignificant coefficients with zeroes. We continue to find a positive and significant coefficient 
on Strong Future Time Reference. Therefore, we take these results as evidence that ethnicities 
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capture individuals’ future orientation as one characteristic that is expected to influence pay 
preferences. 
3.6. Religious Culture of Economic Incentives and Variable Pay Preferences 
Next, we look at the effect of religious culture on variable pay preferences. Evidence 
from World Values Surveys suggests that different religious cultures value economic incentives 
differently (Norris and Inglehart, 2011). Compared with other religious cultures, the survey 
results find that Muslim culture values larger pay differences as incentives for individual effort. 
Furthermore, Muslims have strong beliefs in the role of God’s Will (i.e., In Sha Allah) and 
divine predestination (i.e., Qadar) in shaping the outcome of uncertain events. Islamic teachings 
also tend to favor more variable outcomes as compensation for risk and effort, and as a result 
many commercial transactions in Islamic economies have option-like features. Thus, we 
hypothesize that Muslims prefer a higher proportion of variable pay. 
In Table 11, we regress the ethnicity fixed effects for variable pay from the global model 
in Table 4 on indicator variables for the religious origin of each ethnicity. We separately identify 
Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox. We expect a positive relation if religious 
culture plays a role in compensation preferences. Consistent with this prediction, we find a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient on Muslim (0.090; t-statistic of 2.55), while the 
coefficients on Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox are positive but not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Interestingly, we observe that the coefficient on Jewish is the second largest 
after Muslim and is statistically significant (0.031; t-statistic of 2.35). While we did not have a 
specific ex ante hypothesis for the coefficient on Jewish, we noted earlier that Judaism is 
generally viewed by religious scholars as being closer to Islam than to Christianity. We 
cautiously interpret the positive and significant coefficient on Jewish as some evidence of 
29 
similarity with Muslim in terms of the religious culture of economic incentives (i.e., preference 
for higher proportion of variable pay). The overall explanatory power of religious culture for 
ethnicity fixed effects is 20.8%. For robustness, we redo the analysis after first replacing 
statistically insignificant ethnicity fixed effects with zeroes (column 2), we re-estimate the 
variable pay ethnicity fixed effects after excluding US observations (column 3) and, we use these 
re-estimated variable pay ethnicity effects excluding US observations and replace the statistically 
insignificant coefficients with zeroes (column 4). We continue to find a positive and significant 
coefficient on Muslim in columns 1, 2 and 4 at conventional levels, while the coefficient on 
Muslim in column 3 is significant only at the 15%. The coefficient on Jewish in columns 3 and 4 
is not significant after excluding US observations.  We view these results as additional evidence 
that ethnicities capture religious culture of economic incentives as another characteristic that is 
expected to influence pay preferences.  
In summary, we conclude from the analyses presented in Sections 3.5 and 3.6 that CEOs 
with specific inherited beliefs and values indeed prefer specific compensation arrangements, and 
that ethnicity fixed effects partially capture future time reference and religious culture of 
economic incentives. This evidence is consistent with ethnic origins enabling a systematic and 
objective way to map individuals to their unobservable beliefs and values. 
3.7. Performance-Firing Sensitivity 
Our final analysis examines the relation between inherited beliefs and values and 
performance-firing sensitivity. We expect that a CEO takes into consideration both the 
compensation package and performance-firing sensitivity at the time he or she decides where to 
work. In other words, we argue that performance-firing sensitivity is an aspect of job 
attractiveness for the CEO. Performance-firing sensitivity is measured as the firm-specific time-
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series coefficient on Negative Past Performance from estimating equation (5). We restrict the 
analysis to firms that experience at least one year of negative past performance during our 
sample period to be able to identify the likely instances of involuntary turnover. We then use 
these estimated coefficients as our dependent variable in a second-stage regression using the 
cross-section of 5,428 global firms with at least one year of negative past performance. For firms 
that do not have any CEO turnover during our sample period, a firm-specific performance-firing 
sensitivity cannot be estimated. We interpret these firms as being insensitive to poor performance 
and therefore we assign these observations a zero. Table 12 reports the results. 
Similar to the results for variable pay proportion reported in Table 4, we find an ethnicity 
fixed effect in performance-firing sensitivities. In column 1, the reported F-statistic for the test of 
joint significance of the ethnicity fixed effects is large (2.09) with an associated p-value of 0.000. 
Further, 24.2% of the ethnicity fixed effects are statistically significant at conventional levels. In 
column 2, we restrict our analysis to 1,441 global firms that experience one or more turnover 
events during our sample period (i.e., we remove firms without estimated coefficients that we 
had replaced with zeros). Even in the cross-section of turnover firms, we find the ethnicity fixed 
effects to be jointly significant. In column 3, we rerun the model in column 1 using 2,777 non-
US firms with at least one year of negative past performance, and continue to find statistically 
significant ethnicity effects. 
Further, we find that the ethnicity effects for performance-firing sensitivities are 
positively correlated with the ethnicity effects for variable pay (Pearson correlation of +0.34; 
Spearman correlation of +0.32) suggesting that these measures capture similar inherited beliefs 
and values. However, we note that due to the demanding data requirements of the performance-
firing sensitivity analysis, we only observe 31 ethnicities in the cross-section of 5,428 firms 
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where we can estimate performance-firing sensitivity. Thus, the reported correlations with 
variable pay ethnicity effects are relatively weak in statistical significance (the p-values 
associated with the Pearson and Spearman correlations are 0.073 and 0.088, respectively). We 
cautiously interpret this as evidence that ethnicities that prefer higher variable pay also tend to 
select firms with higher performance-firing sensitivities (i.e., lower job security) as would be 
consistent with lower risk aversion. 
3.8. Limitations 
An important limitation of this study is the existence of endogenous CEO-firm 
matching/selection. This is a common concern in the CEO literature which is also present in our 
global setting. Further, CEOs from certain ethnicities may self-select into certain industries and 
firms due to network effects or cultural influences and this may explain cross-ethnicity variation 
in compensation. In addition to controlling for industry fixed effects in all our models, we have 
also examined industry self-selection by measuring the level of ethnicity-industry concentration 
in our sample. While we do not find a high degree of concentration of any one ethnicity in any 
one industry, this test still cannot rule out the endogenous matching and selection concerns. 
Another limitation of our study is that CEOs’ preferences may not be representative of their 
ethnicity. Due to lack of data availability for a broad sample of non-CEO employees around the 
world, our inferences are limited to the ethnicity pay preferences of CEOs. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the role of inherited beliefs and values in CEO compensation 
contracts using an international setting. We argue that CEOs have the opportunity to influence 
their pay arrangements as CEOs are in a position to negotiate with the Board of Directors about 
32 
compensation, and assert their preferences which are shaped by their common inherited beliefs 
and values (i.e., the beliefs and values of their ancestors). 
We use ethnicity of CEOs as a proxy for their common inherited beliefs and values, and 
find that ethnicity fixed effects are significantly associated with the variable pay proportion of 
CEO compensation. We conduct a battery of robustness tests and continue to find significant 
results. Our results also hold for a sample of US-born CEOs, consistent with ethnicity fixed 
effects capturing inherited and persistent beliefs and values. CEO turnovers where the 
replacement CEO is of a different ethnicity to the predecessor are characterized by larger 
changes in the variable pay proportion. Furthermore, we conduct placebo tests by randomly 
assigning CEOs to ethnicities and confirm that the joint significance of our ethnicity fixed effects 
is not spurious. Importantly, we present evidence that ethnicity effects capture innate 
characteristics, such as future time reference and religious culture of economic incentives, which 
are expected to shape variable pay preferences. 
We examine two different alternative explanations for the observed ethnicity effect in 
compensation and document the following findings. First, while we find an ethnicity effect in 
corporate policy decisions, we do not find that our estimated ethnicity effects for compensation 
are explained by the estimated ethnicity effects for corporate policy decisions, suggesting that the 
ethnicity fixed effects in compensation are not a manifestation of the effect of inherited beliefs 
and values on corporate policy decisions. Second, we find that the effect of inherited beliefs and 
values is stronger when firms replace CEOs with the objective to bring in ‘change agents’, 
suggesting that increased bargaining power might be the more likely reason that firms decide to 
compensate CEOs in line with their ethnicity preferences. 
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Finally, we find that the common inherited beliefs and values of CEOs are also related to 
their preferences for job security. Interestingly, the performance-firing sensitivities of ethnicities 
seem to be consistent with their attitudes towards riskier compensation arrangements. 
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Figure 1: Placebo Test for Randomly Assigned Ethnicities 
This table reports the distribution of F-statistics from a placebo test with random assignment of CEOs to one of 58 ethnicities. 
We estimate the following model for variable pay (CEO subscripts suppressed): 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡 
The F-statistics and associated p-values from a joint significance test of the random ethnicity fixed effects are then computed. 
This process (i.e., random assignment to ethnicities and joint significance F-tests) is simulated 1,000 times and the distribution of 
F-statistics is presented below. There are 57,630 CEO-year observations available. The figure also shows the critical F-statistic at 
the 5% significance level, given the degrees of freedom in the restricted and unrestricted models. 
 
With random assignment of CEOs to one of 58 ethnicities, the estimated ethnicity coefficients are jointly significant in 45 out of 
1,000 simulations. 
  
43
287
405
205
45
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
<0.7 0.7 – 0.9 0.9 – 1.1 1.1 – 1.3 >1.3
F
re
q
u
en
cy
F-statistic 
Critical F (α of 0.05) = 1.33
38 
Table 1: Sample Composition 
This table reports the construction and composition of the main sample comprising 57,630 CEO-year observations 
across 31 countries over the period from 2001 to 2012: 
Sample construction and exclusion criteria applied CEO-years 
Initial CEO-year observations from ExecuComp and Capital IQ 99,219 
Trim variables at 1% and 99% level by country each year -6,074 
Remove missing name classifications, and ethnicities with less than 10 observations -1,704 
Observations lost due to missing data required for main regression variables -12,933 
Remove divergent name classifications for forename and surname -20,878 
CEO-year observations in main sample used in analyses 57,630 
 
Country Data Begins Data Ends 
Average 
Firms 
Country- 
Years 
CEO- 
Years Freq.% 
Australia 2001 2012 435 11 4,783 8.3 
Austria 2004 2012 6 8 45 0.1 
Belgium 2004 2011 13 8 101 0.2 
Canada 2001 2012 456 11 5,019 8.7 
China 2003 2011 77 9 693 1.2 
Denmark 2004 2011 9 8 68 0.1 
Finland 2003 2011 35 9 311 0.5 
France 2001 2011 80 11 880 1.5 
Germany 2002 2011 90 10 903 1.6 
Hong Kong 2001 2012 276 11 3,040 5.3 
Iceland 2005 2009 6 5 31 0.1 
India 2002 2012 326 10 3,258 5.7 
Ireland 2001 2012 23 11 248 0.4 
Israel 2001 2011 9 11 94 0.2 
Italy 2001 2011 72 11 788 1.4 
Japan 2010 2012 17 2 34 0.1 
Malaysia 2002 2011 12 10 120 0.2 
Netherlands 2001 2011 48 11 525 0.9 
New Zealand 2001 2012 17 11 183 0.3 
Norway 2002 2011 41 10 408 0.7 
Pakistan 2003 2008 25 6 151 0.3 
Poland 2004 2011 22 8 174 0.3 
Portugal 2008 2011 8 4 30 0.1 
Singapore 2002 2012 12 10 120 0.2 
South Africa 2001 2012 85 11 931 1.6 
Spain 2003 2011 5 9 48 0.1 
Sweden 2001 2011 55 11 600 1.0 
Switzerland 2001 2012 44 11 482 0.8 
Taiwan 2003 2011 3 6 18 0.0 
United Kingdom 2001 2012 545 11 5,990 10.4 
USA 2001 2012 2,505 11 27,554 47.8 
Total    286 57,630 100.0 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
These tables report descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this study. Panel A reports means, standard deviations and selected percentiles of variables for 
CEO-year observations across 31 countries from 2002 to 2012. The top and bottom 1 percent of all variables each year for each country were excluded, except tenure, 
returns, and idiosyncratic volatility. Panel B reports country-level means of variables across 31 countries from 2001 to 2012 (with a shorter series for some countries as 
indicated in Table 1). Panel C reports means of variables across 58 ethnicities for CEOs from 2001 to 2012 (with a shorter series for some ethnicities). CEO ethnicities 
are identified using OnoMAP’s name-based classification software. Maximum of 57,630 CEO-year observations. 
Panel A: Means, Standard Deviations and Selected Percentiles of Variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. P1 P5 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 P99 
Variable Pay 57,630 0.42 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.41 0.65 0.82 0.88 0.97 
Size 57,630 5.11 2.37 -1.97 1.01 2.35 3.73 5.19 6.66 8.03 8.84 10.07 
Book to Price 57,630 0.80 0.37 0.13 0.24 0.33 0.53 0.80 1.00 1.22 1.41 1.93 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 57,630 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.12 
Annual Stock Return 57,630 0.17 0.80 -0.86 -0.68 -0.54 -0.25 0.06 0.38 0.87 1.38 3.12 
Leverage 57,630 0.42 0.27 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.19 0.39 0.63 0.83 0.89 0.95 
Tenure 57,630 6.05 6.44 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 8.00 14.00 19.00 31.00 
Past Performance 57,630 0.13 0.80 -0.96 -0.62 -0.46 -0.22 0.00 0.28 0.73 1.23 3.13 
Strong Future Time Reference 57,630 0.89 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Annual CEO compensation data is collected from ExecuComp and S&P Capital IQ for US firms, and from S&P Capital IQ for international firms. Each firm is assigned 
to a country based on the geographic location of corporate headquarters. Variable Pay is variable pay as a percentage of total compensation, where variable pay is total 
compensation less the fixed component of compensation (i.e., salary). Specifically, Variable Pay is calculated as (Total Compensation – Salary) / Total Compensation. 
We use total annual compensation reported by the firm or compute it using all available cash and non-cash components of compensation, in constant 2005 US$ 
thousands. The Consumer Price Index in each country is used to adjust compensation items to constant 2005 figures. Compensation data in local currencies is converted 
using the twelve-month average US$ exchange rate. 
Firm fundamentals are collected from Compustat North America, Compustat Global and FactSet Fundamentals to ensure the broadest coverage. Size is the annual sales 
level of the firm, presented in natural logarithms. Book to Price is the enterprise book-to-price ratio calculated as book value of assets divided by market value of assets, 
calculated as the sum of book value of liabilities and market value of equity. Idiosyncratic Volatility (Idio. Vol.) is the annual standard deviation of the residuals from a 
market model estimated using daily returns over the prior year, where market returns are proxied by the MSCI index returns for the location of each firm’s primary stock 
exchange listing. Annual Stock Return is the annual stock return of the firm. US stocks returns are from CRSP, Canadian stocks returns are calculated using price data 
from Compustat North America, and international stocks returns are computed using price data from Compustat Global. We use Compustat adjustment factors to adjust 
prices for stock splits and dividends. Leverage is book value of liabilities divided by market value of assets, calculated as the sum of book value of liabilities and market 
40 
value of equity. Tenure is the number of years the individual has served as CEO of the firm. Past Performance is the annual firm-level stock return for the prior year 
during the CEO’s tenure, adjusted for the industry median stock return. 
Strong Future Time Reference is an indicator variable that measures the degree to which the language associated with the CEO’s ethnicity incorporates a “Future Time 
Reference” that is strong (indicated by 1) or weak (indicated by 0). The Future Time Reference variable is from Chen (2013) which examines the effect of language on 
economic behavior, such as decisions regarding savings, health and retirement assets. A name-based classification software from OnoMAP (www.onomap.org) is used to 
link CEO names to their ethnic origin. The future time reference (strong/weak) for the language associated with the ethnicity is then used to determine the value of Strong 
Future Time Reference. 
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Panel B: Country-level Averages of Variables 
 
Country N Variable Pay Size 
Book-to-
price Idio. Vol. 
Annual Stock 
Return Leverage Tenure 
Australia 4,783 0.33 2.45 0.72 0.05 0.18 0.27 3.60 
Austria 45 0.43 6.96 0.91 0.02 0.09 0.52 4.44 
Belgium 101 0.39 6.39 0.97 0.02 0.13 0.50 3.84 
Canada 5,019 0.42 4.23 0.83 0.04 0.18 0.38 4.78 
China 693 0.32 5.85 1.06 0.04 0.25 0.43 3.02 
Denmark 68 0.33 6.60 0.70 0.02 0.10 0.44 5.84 
Finland 311 0.19 6.10 0.75 0.02 0.12 0.39 4.60 
France 880 0.35 6.73 0.81 0.02 0.14 0.51 4.39 
Germany 903 0.39 5.64 0.80 0.03 0.12 0.44 2.64 
Hong Kong 3,040 0.29 4.60 1.06 0.04 0.30 0.39 3.38 
Iceland 31 0.16 5.97 0.72 0.02 0.09 0.52 3.32 
India 3,258 0.35 4.86 0.90 0.03 0.38 0.52 4.33 
Ireland 248 0.47 6.63 0.74 0.03 0.11 0.46 5.72 
Israel 94 0.34 5.45 0.96 0.03 0.21 0.62 3.77 
Italy 788 0.35 6.22 0.86 0.02 0.02 0.55 2.48 
Japan 34 0.29 8.07 0.88 0.02 0.12 0.49 6.62 
Malaysia 120 0.33 4.99 1.03 0.03 0.18 0.47 4.67 
Netherlands 525 0.42 6.61 0.81 0.03 0.12 0.49 3.71 
New Zealand 183 0.26 4.66 0.72 0.03 0.11 0.34 5.86 
Norway 408 0.30 5.37 0.75 0.03 0.17 0.48 3.79 
Pakistan 151 0.41 4.33 0.81 0.03 0.48 0.51 1.91 
Poland 174 0.29 6.19 0.88 0.02 0.24 0.53 2.70 
Portugal 30 0.38 8.01 0.80 0.02 -0.01 0.59 2.77 
Singapore 120 0.42 5.67 0.83 0.04 0.32 0.42 4.97 
South Africa 931 0.45 5.70 0.78 0.03 0.33 0.41 4.19 
Spain 48 0.31 7.67 0.85 0.02 0.01 0.69 2.27 
Sweden 600 0.37 5.62 0.72 0.03 0.19 0.38 3.51 
Switzerland 482 0.52 6.79 0.76 0.02 0.06 0.42 5.26 
Taiwan 18 0.20 6.42 0.81 0.02 0.61 0.37 10.50 
United Kingdom 5,990 0.30 4.84 0.78 0.03 0.10 0.40 4.53 
USA 27,554 0.49 5.61 0.76 0.03 0.14 0.45 8.18 
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Panel C: Ethnicity-level Averages of Selected Variables 
 
Ethnicity N 
Variable 
Pay Tenure 
Strong Future 
Time Reference 
AFRICAN 27 0.43 4.33 1 
AFRIKANER 54 0.40 3.65 1 
ARMENIAN 37 0.33 2.30 1 
BALKAN 33 0.32 5.58 1 
BANGLADESHI 18 0.44 2.61 1 
BANGLADESHI / HINDI* 17 0.36 1.76 1 
BLACK CARIBBEAN 24 0.42 3.58 1 
BLACK SOUTHERN AFRICAN 17 0.52 2.00 1 
BRETON 18 0.49 9.78 1 
CATALAN 12 0.29 7.58 1 
CELTIC 5,814 0.45 6.71 1 
CHINESE 1,328 0.32 3.11 0 
CZECH 14 0.46 3.71 1 
DANISH 260 0.33 3.53 0 
DUTCH 110 0.40 4.57 0 
EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC 413 0.32 5.42 1 
ENGLISH 28,710 0.43 6.53 1 
EUROPEAN* 1,121 0.46 6.67 1 
FINNISH 282 0.19 4.49 0 
FRENCH 1,106 0.40 5.24 1 
GERMAN 1,149 0.43 4.73 0 
GREEK 150 0.36 5.33 1 
GREEK / CYPRIOT* 131 0.31 5.45 1 
HISPANIC 102 0.48 4.09 1 
HONG KONGESE 2,372 0.29 3.73 0 
HUNGARIAN 12 0.36 5.83 1 
INDIAN 2,073 0.35 4.57 1 
INDIAN NORTH 686 0.36 4.19 1 
IRANIAN 27 0.47 8.81 1 
IRISH 3,178 0.47 6.45 1 
ITALIAN 1,182 0.38 4.43 1 
JAPANESE 93 0.28 4.82 0 
JEWISH 344 0.45 10.19 1 
JEWISH / ARMENIAN* 235 0.46 8.05 1 
LEBANESE 14 0.43 2.50 1 
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Panel C: Ethnicity-level Averages of Selected Variables (continued) 
 
Ethnicity N 
Variable 
Pay Tenure 
Strong Future 
Time Reference 
MALAYSIAN 11 0.57 9.18 1 
NIGERIAN 40 0.33 12.15 0 
NORDIC 151 0.41 5.15 0 
NORTHERN IRISH 14 0.37 4.14 1 
NORWEGIAN 30 0.35 4.93 0 
PAKISTANI 290 0.36 4.80 1 
PAKISTANI / KASHMIRI 59 0.40 3.49 1 
POLISH 464 0.36 4.44 1 
PORTUGUESE 89 0.39 4.44 1 
RUSSIAN 44 0.33 3.91 1 
SCOTTISH 3,244 0.44 6.58 1 
SERBIAN 10 0.38 2.10 1 
SIKH 366 0.37 5.15 1 
SOMALIAN 32 0.48 3.41 1 
SOUTH ASIAN 330 0.41 5.35 1 
SOUTH KOREAN 19 0.36 16.42 1 
SPANISH 124 0.45 7.31 1 
SRI LANKAN 134 0.35 4.73 1 
SWEDISH 517 0.36 3.77 0 
TURKISH 34 0.62 5.06 1 
UKRANIAN 29 0.41 10.03 1 
VIETNAMESE 81 0.33 5.80 1 
WELSH 355 0.45 6.95 1 
 
 
 
                                                 
 We use ethnicity classifications as they are provided by OnoMAP’s name-based classification software. In certain 
instances, the software is unable to provide a precise classification (e.g., Jewish / Armenian, or European); these ethnicity 
groups are indicated with an asterisk. In robustness tests, we have removed these observations and repeated our main 
analyses. Further, we have also removed those observations that are classified as English because they comprise a 
significant portion of our sample. Our key results remain unchanged. Recall that in constructing our main sample of 
57,630 CEO-year observations, we have also removed those instances where there is a conflict between a person’s 
forename and surname (i.e., divergent name classification), and those instances where the forename and the surname are 
unclassified or are not found in OnoMAP’s dictionaries. 
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Table 3: Average Yearly Correlations between Variables 
This table reports time-series averages of yearly Pearson and Spearman correlations between CEO-year variables across 31 
countries from 2001 to 2012. Pearson correlations are reported above the diagonal, and Spearman correlations are reported 
below the diagonal. See Table 2 (Panel A) for description of variables. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) Variable Pay 
 
0.399 -0.133 -0.247 0.106 0.012 0.095 0.049 
(2) Size 0.424 
 
0.002 -0.511 -0.014 0.246 0.105 -0.037 
(3) Book to Price -0.125 -0.014 
 
0.003 0.108 0.579 -0.039 -0.249 
(4) Idiosyncratic Volatility -0.291 -0.533 -0.007 
 
0.038 -0.114 -0.082 0.097 
(5) Annual Stock Return 0.184 0.087 0.124 -0.126 
 
0.073 -0.002 -0.019 
(6) Leverage 0.020 0.232 0.660 -0.169 0.110 
 
-0.021 -0.186 
(7) Tenure 0.169 0.151 -0.086 -0.087 0.021 -0.032 
 
0.000 
(8) Past Performance 0.118 0.066 -0.285 -0.091 0.006 -0.184 0.025  
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Table 4: Global Model of Variable Pay 
This table report coefficient estimates from panel regressions of CEO Variable Pay on various characteristics. Specifically, we 
estimate the following base model using our sample of 57,630 CEO-year observations (CEO subscripts suppressed): 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
In column 1 we only control for economic determinants of compensation suggested in prior literature. In columns 2–4, we also 
include year and industry fixed effects. In column 3, we control for country fixed effects, in column 4 we add ethnicity fixed 
effects, and in column 5 we control for firm fixed effects. In column 6, we estimate a hybrid correlated random effects model that 
includes CEO fixed effects and random effects for year, industry, country, firm and ethnicity (see Wooldridge, 2010). The reported 
t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by ethnicity and year. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The tables also reports F-statistics and associated p-values from a joint 
significance test of the ethnicity effects estimated in columns 4–6, as well as the percentage of ethnicity effects that are statistically 
significant. See Table 2 (Panel A) for description of variables. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
      
  
  
    
Size 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.001 
 (4.06) (4.00) (4.80) (4.75) (0.40) (0.97) 
Book to Price -0.122*** -0.135*** -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.046*** -0.047*** 
 (-11.26) (-14.48) (-11.22) (-11.22) (-4.85) (-7.26) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (-9.24) (-12.22) (-17.16) (-17.23) (-5.72) (-5.60) 
Annual Stock Return 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (5.80) (5.54) (7.15) (7.15) (6.41) (19.52) 
Leverage 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.019 0.019 -0.031*** -0.030** 
 (3.79) (3.31) (1.50) (1.49) (-2.90) (-2.36) 
Tenure 0.003*** 0.004*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001** 
 (4.90) (5.31) (-0.64) (-0.64) (-3.67) (-2.39) 
Past Performance 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (3.89) (3.92) (6.14) (6.39) (6.21) (10.85) 
 
 
 
    
Observations (CEO-years) 57,630 57,630 57,630 57,630 57,630 57,630 
Adjusted R-squared 13.4% 17.9% 70.1% 76.4% 63.3% 27.4% 
Year Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects  Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Country Effects  
 
Yes Yes No Yes 
Ethnicity Effects  
 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effects  
 
  Yes Yes 
CEO Effects  
 
   Yes 
      
Joint Sig. F (Ethnicity Effects)     2.62 2.52 1.67 
Prob > F (Ethnicity Effects)     (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Significant Ethnicity Effects (%)     29.8 23.6 21.1 
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Table 5: Ethnicity Effect on Variable Pay for US-Born CEOs 
This table reports coefficient estimates from panel regressions of Variable Pay on various characteristics using only a subset of 
CEOs in the US for whom place of birth was available, and that were born in the US. Specifically, we estimate the following 
model using the reduced sample of 684 CEO-year observations with available data (CEO subscripts suppressed): 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 +  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1
+ 𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡 
In column 1 we use the above specification, while in column 2 we replace Past Performance with General Ability Index as an 
alternative measure of ability. The ability measure is from Custodio, Ferreira and Matos (2013) and uses the following aspects of a 
CEO’s professional career to develop an index of general managerial skill: past number of positions, firms, and industries in which 
a CEO worked; whether the CEO held a CEO position at a different company; and whether the CEO worked for a conglomerate 
(data is from http://docentes.fe.unl.pt/~mferreira/). Age is the CEO’s age in years. Postgraduate Education is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds a masters or doctoral degree, and 0 otherwise. Founder is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the CEO is a founder of the firm, and 0 otherwise. Gender is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
CEO is male, and 0 otherwise. The reported t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by ethnicity. The asterisks *, **, and 
*** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The table also reports F-statistics and 
associated p-values from a joint significance test of the estimated ethnicity fixed effects, as well as the percentage of ethnicity 
effects that are statistically significant. See Table 2 (Panel A) for description of variables. 
  (1) (2) 
 Variable Pay Variable Pay 
  
 
 
Size -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.99) (-0.81) 
Book to Price -0.048 -0.022 
 (-0.36) (-0.20) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -0.041*** -0.032*** 
 (-9.10) (-3.83) 
Annual Stock Return 0.049** 0.072*** 
 (2.78) (7.78) 
Leverage 0.027 0.013 
 (0.17) (0.08) 
Tenure -0.002* -0.000 
 (-2.10) (-0.07) 
Past Performance 0.049***  
 (6.09)  
General Ability Index 
 
0.008 
 (0.56) 
Age 0.000 0.000 
 (0.57) (0.05) 
Postgraduate Education 0.055*** 0.046** 
 (6.47) (2.96) 
Founder 0.028 -0.000 
 (0.97) (-0.01) 
Gender 0.060 0.000 
 (1.61) (0.00) 
  
 
Observations 684 590 
Adjusted R-squared 47.6% 47.7% 
   
Joint Sig. F (Ethnicity Effects) 6.60 3.00 
Prob > F (Ethnicity Effects) (0.000) (0.007) 
Significant Ethnicity Effects (%) 50.0 50.0 
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Table 6: Effect of Change in Ethnicity around CEO Turnover Events on Compensation 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions of absolute change in CEO variable pay proportion on absolute change in 
various firm and CEO characteristics around CEO turnover events. The sample includes 440 US firms that experience CEO 
turnover once during our sample period, and where all data is available. Changes are computed using data for the last full year 
prior to the incumbent CEO’s departure (i.e., OLD CEO) and the first full year after the replacement CEO’s arrival (i.e., NEW 
CEO). CEO turnover years are excluded. We estimate the following model (CEO subscripts suppressed): 
|Δ𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦%| =  𝛽1|Δ𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒| + 𝛽2|Δ𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒| + 𝛽3|Δ𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦| + 𝛽4|Δ𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛|
+ 𝛽5|Δ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒| + 𝛽6|Δ𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥| + 𝛽7|Δ𝐴𝑔𝑒| + 𝛽8|Δ𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛|
+ 𝛽9|Δ𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒| + 𝛽10|Δ𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛| + 𝛽11𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
The dependent variable is the absolute change in Variable Pay % (i.e., variable pay proportion) where change is computed as 
𝑙𝑛(𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑦%𝑁𝐸𝑊 𝐶𝐸𝑂/𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑦%𝑂𝐿𝐷 𝐶𝐸𝑂) and 𝑙𝑛 is the natural logarithm operator. We control for absolute change in 
firm characteristics (including Size, Book to Price, Idiosyncratic Volatility, Annual Stock Return, and Leverage), absolute change 
in CEO characteristics (General Ability Index, Age, Postgraduate Education, and Tenure) as well as absolute change in Total 
Compensation between the replacement and incumbent CEO. General Ability Index is from Custodio, Ferreira and Matos (2013) 
and uses the following aspects of a CEO’s professional career to develop an index of general managerial skill: past number of 
positions, firms, and industries in which a CEO worked; whether the CEO held a CEO position at a different company; and 
whether the CEO worked for a conglomerate (data is from http://docentes.fe.unl.pt/~mferreira/). In column 1, the primary variable 
of interest is Change in Ethnicity which is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if the ethnicity of the replacement CEO 
is different from the ethnicity of the incumbent CEO, zero otherwise. We exclude ethnicity fixed effects as we are interested in 
estimating the effect of all ethnicity changes as a group using the Change in Ethnicity variable. In column 2 we examine whether 
turnover events where the incumbent CEO was not retiring are associated with a stronger effect of Change in Ethnicity. We 
include CEO Not Retiring as an indicator variable that equals 1 if the age of the incumbent CEO is less than 65 years, zero 
otherwise. The primary variable of interest is the interaction term: Change in Ethnicity × CEO Not Retiring. The reported t-
statistics are based on standard errors clustered by ethnicity. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See Table 2 (Panel A) for description of variables. 
 (1) (2) 
  |Δ𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦%| |Δ𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦%| 
   |Δ𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒| -0.027 -0.035 
 (-0.18) (-0.21) 
|Δ𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒| 0.157 0.213 
 (0.95) (1.15) 
|Δ𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦| 0.281*** 0.314** 
 (3.28) (2.77) 
|Δ𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛| 0.126 0.120 
 (1.15) (0.96) 
|Δ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒| -0.080 -0.084 
 (-0.79) (-0.80) 
|Δ𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥| 0.031** 0.039 
 (2.33) (0.88) 
|Δ𝐴𝑔𝑒| 0.001 0.001 
 (0.16) (0.27) 
|Δ𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛| -0.319*** -0.328*** 
 (-5.42) (-4.08) 
|Δ𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒| 0.002 0.002 
 (0.45) (0.51) 
|Δ𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛| 0.598*** 0.602*** 
 (4.78) (7.70) 
Change in Ethnicity 0.051** -0.090 
 (2.05) (-1.53) 
CEO Not Retiring  -0.249*** 
  (-6.45) 
Change in Ethnicity × CEO Not Retiring  0.262* 
  (1.96) 
   Adjusted R-squared 12.7% 12.4% 
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Table 7: Ethnicity Effects for Corporate Policy and CEO Compensation 
This table reports coefficient estimates from panel regressions of corporate policy variables and CEO variable pay on firm and CEO characteristics, as well as year, firm and 
ethnicity fixed effects. Since we require data on all policy variables, the sample is reduced to 53,999 CEO-years. We estimate the following model (CEO subscripts suppressed): 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜. 𝑉𝑜𝑙.𝑡−1+ 𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡 
The dependent variable is indicated at the top of columns 1–7. R&D is R&D spending scaled by average total assets, Investment is the sum of capital expenditures and R&D 
spending scaled by average total assets, Leverage is liabilities scaled by assets, Cash Holdings is cash and cash equivalents scaled by average total assets, Dividend Payer is a 
yearly indicator for whether the firm pays dividend, Dividend Yield is common dividends scaled by price, and Variable Pay is the percentage of CEO total compensation that is not 
fixed. To enable cross-country comparability, each year we sort all firms within a country into quartiles on the basis of each variable (except Dividend Payer) and use these ranks 
as the dependent variable to estimate the above model. The reported t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by ethnicity and year. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate 
two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The table also reports F-statistics and associated p-values from a joint significance test of the 
ethnicity fixed effects from each model, as well as the percentage of ethnicity effects that are statistically significant. See Table 2 (Panel A) for description of all variables.  
Panel A: Estimating the Ethnicity Effects for Corporate Policy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 R&D Investment Leverage Cash Holdings Dividend Payer Dividend Yield Variable Pay 
        
Size -0.003** 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.006* 0.009*** 0.005 
 
(-2.11) (0.31) (0.09) (0.78) (1.71) (2.80) (1.01) 
Book-to-price -0.004 -0.125** -0.448*** -0.038 -0.003 0.047** -0.196*** 
 
(-0.19) (-2.53) (-11.71) (-1.20) (-0.13) (2.54) (-4.66) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -0.000 -0.004*** -0.015*** 0.014*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022*** 
 
(-0.27) (-3.48) (-6.56) (3.77) (-3.74) (-3.71) (-4.68) 
Annual Stock Return 0.004 0.048*** -0.050*** 0.123*** 0.044*** -0.002 0.148*** 
 
(1.15) (9.20) (-4.90) (12.73) (5.02) (-0.32) (5.50) 
Leverage -0.051*** -0.636*** 1.605*** -0.984*** -0.470*** -0.325*** -0.166** 
 
(-3.06) (-10.32) (11.34) (-17.77) (-9.68) (-7.82) (-2.54) 
Tenure 0.000 0.001 0.002** -0.003*** 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.39) (1.40) (2.10) (-2.81) (5.28) (5.25) (-2.89) 
Past Performance -0.003 0.018*** 0.003 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.004 0.066*** 
 
(-0.72) (3.70) (0.47) (3.52) (2.97) (0.72) (4.09) 
  
 
     Observations 53,999 53,999 53,999 53,999 53,999 53,999 53,999 
Adjusted R-squared 85.8% 77.4% 75.3% 70.4% 74.9% 72.2% 53.0% 
  
 
     Joint Sig. F (Ethnicity Effects) 2.43 1.84 1.29 1.12 2.09 2.29 2.44 
Prob > F (Ethnicity Effects) 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.257 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
 
     
Significant Ethnicity Effects (%) 23.6% 21.8% 21.8% 20.0% 16.4% 18.2% 27.3% 
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Panel B: Correlations between Ethnicity Variable Pay Effects and Ethnicity Policy Effects 
This table reports pairwise correlations between the ethnicity fixed effects for variable pay estimated in Table 7, Panel A (column 
7) and the ethnicity fixed effects estimated for each corporate policy variable in Table 7, Panel A (columns 1–6). The procedure 
used to estimate the ethnicity fixed effect (F.E.) for each variable is described in the caption for Table 7, Panel A. Variable Pay is 
the percentage of CEO total compensation that is not fixed (i.e., salary), R&D is R&D spending scaled by average total assets, 
Investment is the sum of capital expenditures and R&D spending scaled by average total assets, Cash Holdings is cash and cash 
equivalents scaled by average total assets, Leverage is liabilities scaled by assets, and Dividend Payer is a yearly indicator for 
whether the firm pays dividend, Dividend Yield is common dividends scaled by price. The asterisks * indicate statistical 
significance of the correlation coefficients at the 10% or above level. 
 Variable Pay 
F.E. 
R&D  
F.E. 
Investment 
F.E. 
Leverage 
F.E. 
Cash 
Holdings F.E. 
Dividend 
Payer F.E. 
R&D F.E. 0.0424 
 
    
 (0.758)      
Investment F.E. 0.2004 0.3693*     
 (0.142) (0.006)     
Leverage F.E. 0.3433* -0.0871 0.4061* 
 
  
 (0.010) (0.527) (0.002)    
Cash Holdings F.E. -0.2319* 0.2551* -0.1609 -0.3429* 
 
 
 (0.088) (0.060) (0.241) (0.010)   
Dividend Payer F.E. -0.0545 -0.1465 0.0617 0.1296 -0.2201 
 
 (0.693) (0.286) (0.655) (0.346) (0.106)  
Dividend Yield F.E. 0.2834* -0.0166 0.4097* 0.5138* -0.2570* 0.8036* 
 (0.036) (0.905) (0.002) (0.000) (0.058) (0.000) 
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Panel C: Explaining Ethnicity Variable Pay Effects with Ethnicity Policy Effects 
This table reports results from a regression of the ethnicity fixed effects for variable pay estimated in Table 7, Panel A (column 7) 
on the ethnicity fixed effects estimated for each corporate policy variable in Table 7, Panel A (columns 1–6).  Specifically, the 
following cross-ethnicity model is estimated for variable pay ethnicity fixed effects: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹. 𝐸.𝑖+ 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹. 𝐸.𝑖+ 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹. 𝐸.𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹. 𝐸.𝑖+ 𝛽5𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹. 𝐸.𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖 
Variable Pay Ethnicity Fixed Effects are estimated from a global model for variable pay which controls for year, firm, and 
ethnicity effects (see column 7 of Table 7, Panel A). The procedure used to estimate the ethnicity fixed effect for each variable is 
described in the caption for Table 7, Panel A. Variable Pay is the percentage of CEO total compensation that is not fixed (i.e., 
salary), R&D is R&D spending scaled by average total assets, Investment is the sum of capital expenditures and R&D spending 
scaled by average total assets, Cash Holdings is cash and cash equivalents scaled by average total assets, Leverage is liabilities 
scaled by assets, and Dividend Yield is common dividends scaled by price. In estimating these models, we do not include Dividend 
Payer Ethnicity Fixed Effects as they are highly correlated with Dividend Payer Ethnicity Fixed Effects (See Table 7, Panel B). In 
column 1, we estimate the various ethnicity fixed effects using within-country annual ranks for each variable and in column 2, we 
estimate the various ethnicity fixed effects using continuous values for each variables. Robust t-statistics are reported below each 
coefficient. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 
Variable Pay 
Ethnicity F.E. 
Variable Pay 
Ethnicity F.E. 
R&D Ethnicity F.E. 0.809 0.324 
 
(0.53) (1.14) 
Investment Ethnicity F.E. -0.020 -0.556 
 
(-0.10) (-1.05) 
Leverage Ethnicity F.E. 0.382 -0.007 
 
(1.11) (-0.02) 
Cash Holdings Ethnicity F.E. -0.380 -0.972** 
 
(-0.79) (-2.11) 
Dividend Yield Ethnicity F.E. 0.133 -0.043 
 
(0.53) (-1.15) 
Constant -0.027 0.007 
 
(-0.35) (0.57) 
   Observations 58 58 
Adjusted R-squared 6.9% 11.2% 
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Table 8: Global Model of Variable Pay Controlling for Corporate Policy 
This table reports coefficient estimates from panel regressions of CEO variable pay on various characteristics, including corporate 
policy variables. Since we require data on all policy variables, the sample is reduced to 53,999 CEO-years. Columns 1, 2 and 3 use 
the same models that are reported in Table 4 (see columns 4, 5 and 6) with additional controls for corporate policy. Investment is 
the sum of capital expenditures and R&D spending scaled by average total assets, R&D is R&D spending scaled by average total 
assets, Leverage is liabilities scaled by assets, Cash Holdings is cash and cash equivalents scaled by average total assets, Dividend 
Payer is a yearly indicator for whether the firm pays dividend, Dividend Yield is common dividends scaled by price The reported t-
statistics are based on standard errors clustered by ethnicity and year. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The table also reports F-statistics and associated p-values from a joint 
significance test of the estimated ethnicity effects for variable pay, as well as the percentage of ethnicity effects that are 
statistically significant. See Table 2 (Panel A) for description of variables. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
   
Size 0.009*** 0.001 0.001 
 (5.47) (0.59) (0.99) 
Book-to-price -0.096*** -0.044*** -0.045*** 
 (-9.55) (-4.34) (-6.67) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -0.023*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-15.59) (-4.47) (-4.82) 
Annual Stock Return 0.043*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (7.17) (6.04) (17.80) 
Tenure -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-1.06) (-3.74) (-2.65) 
Past Performance 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (7.36) (5.62) (10.53) 
Investment -0.033 0.055* 0.055** 
 (-1.29) (1.79) (2.05) 
R&D -0.060 -0.180*** -0.187*** 
 (-1.61) (-3.01) (-3.48) 
Leverage 0.011 -0.016 -0.014 
 (0.84) (-1.46) (-0.99) 
Cash Holdings 0.026*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (2.61) (2.59) (3.05) 
Dividend Payer 0.054*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 
 (12.49) (7.68) (8.74) 
Dividend Yield -0.299*** -0.214*** -0.219*** 
 (-4.20) (-2.67) (-4.52) 
 
   
Observations (CEO-years) 53,999 53,999 53,999 
Adjusted R-squared 76.8% 63.7% 28.3% 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes No Yes 
Country Effects Yes No Yes 
Ethnicity Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effects  Yes Yes 
CEO Effects   Yes 
    
Joint Sig. F (Ethnicity Effects) 2.49 2.58 1.65 
Prob > F (Ethnicity Effects) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Significant Ethnicity Effects (%) 26.3 23.6 17.5 
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Table 9: Effect of Change in Ethnicity around CEO Turnover Events on Future Outcomes 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions of post-turnover firm-level future outcomes (i.e., future employee growth 
and future productivity growth) on whether the replacement CEO has a different ethnicity than the incumbent CEO (Change in 
Ethnicity), conditional on the firm experiencing a Past Decline in the future outcome of interest. The sample is reduced to include 
only the 1,305 US firms that experience CEO turnover once during our sample period, and where all firm-level control variables 
are available. We examine the last full year prior to the incumbent CEO’s departure and the first full year after the replacement 
CEO’s arrival. CEO turnover years are excluded. The following model is estimated (firm and year subscripts suppressed): 
𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 =  𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 +Σ𝛾𝑋𝑡
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
𝑋𝑡  is a vector of control variables including Size, Book-to-price, Idiosyncratic Volatility, Annual Stock Return and Past 
Performance. In columns 1 and 2, the future outcome of interest is Future Employee Growth and in columns 3 and 4, it is Future 
Productivity Growth. Future Employee Growth is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1, if employee growth is positive 
in the first full year after the replacement CEO is hired, zero otherwise. Future Productivity Growth is an indicator variable that 
takes on the value of 1, if productivity growth is positive in the first full year after the replacement CEO is hired, zero otherwise. 
Productivity is defined as sales per employee, and productivity growth is defined as log changes in sales per employee. Past 
Decline is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1, if employee growth (productivity growth) was negative in the last full 
year prior to the departure of the incumbent CEO, zero otherwise. In columns 1 and 2, Past Decline refers to past decline in 
employee growth and in columns 3 and 4, Past Decline refers to past decline in productivity growth. Change in Ethnicity is an 
indicator variable that takes on the value of 1, if the ethnicity of the replacement CEO is different from the ethnicity of the 
incumbent CEO, zero otherwise. The interaction term for Change in Ethnicity × Past Decline identifies the incremental effect of a 
change in CEO ethnicity around turnover events on future outcomes (either future employee growth or future productivity 
growth), conditional on the firm experiencing past declines in these outcomes. In columns 2 and 4, we restrict the sample to the 
920 observations where the incumbent CEO was not leaving due to retirement measured as the age of the incumbent CEO being 
less than 65 years. All specifications include year fixed effects. The reported t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by 
ethnicity. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See 
notes below Table 2 for description of the control variables. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Future 
Employee 
Growth 
Future 
Employee 
Growth 
Future 
Productivity 
Growth 
Future 
Productivity 
Growth 
          
Change in Ethnicity -0.032** -0.015 0.047** -0.001 
 
(-2.04) (-0.84) (2.14) (-0.04) 
Past Decline -0.129*** -0.098*** 0.024 -0.038 
 
(-10.22) (-9.07) (0.56) (-1.48) 
Change in Ethnicity × Past Decline 0.082** 0.057** 0.011 0.068* 
 
(3.09) (2.53) (0.19) (1.72) 
    
Observations 1,305 920 1,305 920 
Adjusted R-squared 11.2% 12.6% 10.5% 11.0% 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10: Variable Pay Ethnicity Preferences and Future Time Reference 
This table reports results from a regression of variable pay ethnicity preferences on a measure of future time reference for each 
ethnicity using the language associated with that ethnicity. Specifically, the following cross-ethnicity model is estimated for 
variable pay ethnicity fixed effects: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variable Pay Ethnicity Fixed Effects are estimated from a global model for variable pay which controls for year, industry, and 
country effects (see column 4 of Table 4). A name-based ethnicity classification software from OnoMAP is used to link CEO 
names to the most likely language of their ethnicity. Strong Future Time Reference is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
(0) if the language associated with the ethnicity incorporates a strong (weak) “Future Time Reference”. The future time reference 
variable is based on data from Chen (2013) who examines the effect of language on economic behavior, such as decisions 
regarding savings, health and retirement assets. A name-based ethnicity classification software from OnoMAP is used to link CEO 
names to their ethnic origin. The degree of future time reference (strong/weak) exhibited by the language associated with the 
ethnicity is then used to determine the value of Strong Future Time Reference. In column 1, we use all the variable pay ethnicity 
fixed effects estimated using the global model including insignificant ones. In column 2, we replace the statistically insignificant 
ethnicity fixed effects with zeroes and rerun the regression. In column 3, we use the variable pay ethnicity fixed effects re-
estimated from a global model after excluding all observations for the United States. In column 4, we use the same fixed effects as 
in column 3 (i.e., estimated after excluding US observations) except that we replace statistically insignificant fixed effects with 
zeroes. Robust t-statistics are reported below each coefficient. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All F.E.s 
Insignificant 
F.E.s coded 0 Excl. US 
Excl. US and 
insignificant 
F.E.s coded 0 
      
Strong Future Time Reference 0.040*** 0.032** 0.039*** 0.033** 
 
(3.45) (2.65) (2.90) (2.50) 
 
    
Constant 0.695*** 0.306*** 0.448*** 0.153*** 
 
(89.30) (2.97) (52.29) (2.46) 
 
    
Observations (Ethnicities) 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 8.1% 5.6% 5.4% 4.0% 
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Table 11: Variable Pay Ethnicity Preferences and Religious Culture of Economic Incentives 
This table reports results from a regression of variable pay ethnicity preferences on the most common religious affiliation of each 
ethnicity. Specifically, the following cross-ethnicity model is estimated for variable pay ethnicity fixed effects: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑢𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑥𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variable Pay Ethnicity Fixed Effects are estimated from a global model for variable pay which controls for year, industry, and 
country effects (see column 4 of Table 4). A name-based ethnicity classification software from OnoMAP is used to link CEO 
names to the most likely religious affiliation of their ethnicity. Five religion groups are identified using indicator variables: 
Muslim, Jewish, Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox. The remaining religion groups such as Buddhist, Hindu and Sikh are included 
in the benchmark group. In column 1, we use all the variable pay ethnicity fixed effects estimated using the global model including 
insignificant ones. In column 2, we replace the statistically insignificant ethnicity fixed effects with zeroes and rerun the 
regression. In column 3, we use the variable pay ethnicity fixed effects re-estimated from a global model after excluding all 
observations for the United States. In column 4, we use the same fixed effects as in column 3 (i.e., estimated after excluding US 
observations) except that we replace statistically insignificant fixed effects with zeroes. Robust t-statistics are reported below each 
coefficient. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All F.E.s 
Insignificant 
F.E.s coded 0 Excl. US 
Excl. US and 
insignificant 
F.E.s coded 0 
      
Muslim 0.090** 0.075** 0.056 0.059* 
 (2.55) (2.06) (1.63) (1.97) 
Jewish 0.031** 0.019* -0.001 -0.010 
 (2.35) (1.69) (-0.02) (-0.20) 
Protestant 0.012 0.015 -0.003 0.023 
 (0.80) (1.20) (-0.10) (0.96) 
Catholic 0.024 0.019 -0.004 -0.004 
 (1.61) (1.32) (-0.14) (-0.17) 
Orthodox 0.001 -0.007 0.013 0.004 
 (0.03) (-0.33) (0.55) (0.11) 
 
    
Constant 0.705*** 0.348*** 0.465*** 0.269*** 
 
(57.93) (3.26) (34.05) (3.77) 
 
    
Observations (Ethnicities) 58 58 58 58 
Adjusted R-squared 20.8% 17.6% 4.8% 3.6% 
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Table 12: Performance-Firing Sensitivity and Ethnicity Effects 
This table report coefficient estimates from second-stage regressions of firm-level estimated performance-firing sensitivity on 
various firm characteristics. In the first stage, we estimate performance-firing sensitivity for each firm using time-series 
regressions of CEO turnover on firm size, CEO tenure and a measure of negative past performance. The firm-level coefficient on 
negative past performance provides an estimate of performance-firing sensitivity and is our dependent variable for the second-
stage regression. We use an indicator variable to identify instances of CEO turnover, which takes on the value of 1 in a turnover 
year and 0 otherwise. To measure past performance, we use the annual firm-level stock return for the prior year during the CEO’s 
tenure, adjusted for the industry median stock return. We then identify all firm-years with negative past performance using an 
indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 when the industry-adjusted stock return is negative, and 0 otherwise. For the first 
stage, in order to assess whether poor past performance is associated with CEO turnover, we focus only on those firms that 
experience at least one instance of negative past performance, and we also require a minimum of 4 years of data for each firm. 
These data restrictions reduce the estimation sample to 42,319 observations for 5,428 firms. We store the firm-level coefficients 
from the first-stage regressions to use as dependent variables for the second-stage regression. For firms that do not have any CEO 
turnover during our sample period, a coefficient cannot be estimated and we assign a performance-firing sensitivity of zero. We 
use the most recent available observation for each firm to identify the ethnicity of the CEO at that firm, as well as to collect firm 
characteristics. Then, we estimate the following second-stage regression using the cross-section of 5,428 firms (column 1): 
𝑃𝐹𝑆𝑖 =  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
PFS is the performance-firing sensitivity coefficient from the first stage. We use the same firm-level control variables as are in our 
global model for variable pay (Table 4), and we also include year, industry, country and ethnicity fixed effects. We assess whether 
the estimated ethnicity fixed effects are jointly significant. The tables reports F-statistics and associated p-values from a joint 
significance test of the estimated ethnicity fixed effects, as well as the percentage of ethnicity effects that are statistically 
significant. In column 2, we restrict our analysis to the 1,441 firms that experience one or more turnovers during our sample 
period. The reported t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered by ethnicity. In column 3, we restrict our analysis to the 
2,777 non-US firms for which we can estimate performance-firing sensitivity coefficients. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate 
two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. See Table 2 (Panel A) for description of variables. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
All Firms Turnover Firms Excl. US 
     Size -0.001 -0.003*** -0.001 
 (-1.11) (-3.03) (-0.81) 
Book-to-price 0.003 0.016 0.018* 
 (0.23) (0.37) (1.72) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility -0.002 -0.015*** -0.002* 
 (-1.56) (-6.12) (-1.73) 
Annual Stock Return -0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (-0.31) (0.01) (0.18) 
Leverage 0.001 0.018 -0.018 
 (0.12) (0.71) (-0.92) 
 
   
Observations (firms) 5,428 1,441 2,777 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8% 2.8% 0.6% 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnicity Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    Joint Sig. F (Ethnicity Effects) 2.09 2.35 1.73 
Prob > F (Ethnicity Effects) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) 
Significant Ethnicity Effects (%) 24.2 26.1 20.0 
 
